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Abstract 
 
This research examines the successes and challenges of the European Union, especially 
in the face of the crisis of 2008 and 2009. Based on the current structures of the European 
Union and Mercosur, this paper looks to assess the viability of further integration of 
Mercosur using the evolution of the European Union as a model of reference. Analysis of 
key economic measures provides the framework for assessment, with a special focus on 
the asymmetries between member countries within Mercosur. Differences in debt-to-
GDP ratios, regional trade levels, and exchange rate fluctuations are the primary 
indicators used to provide policy recommendations for the future of Mercosur. Based on 
high levels of inequality on the key measures considered within the paper, greater 
integration within Mercosur is encouraged, given improvement upon and adherence to 
guidelines originally set forth by the European Union.  
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Introduction 
 
 The European Union is widely regarded as a successful experiment in international 
economic and political integration. Indeed, it has largely succeeded in creating a unified front for 
fiscal, monetary, trade, and political policies. The EU’s global power has drawn the attention of 
the rest of the world as a potential model for extensive integration on several fronts. However in 
recent years, the area has been deeply troubled by the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, with a 
strong impact on countries like Spain, Portugal, and Greece. The stability and longevity of the 
union are up for debate, as these weaker members must lean heavily on the rest of the EU for 
support. In response to these recent issues, this paper looks to examine the viability of the 
European Union as an example for the Latin American union of MercoSur, given the trials of the 
recent crisis in the European Union.  
 This research question has strong implications for MercoSur and other regional trade 
blocs, as there are lessons to be learned from the formation and structure of the European Union. 
If the EU can serve as a roadmap for integration in other areas of the world, is it necessary to 
follow this path exactly? More importantly, what are the pitfalls encountered by the EU, and how 
can others avoid them in the future? 
 In addition to the consideration of demographic structure, there are several important 
variables to consider in the analysis of this question. Most important among these are the rates of 
growth and inflation, in conjunction with the debt percentage and exchange rates for individual 
nations and in aggregate. These variables give a more-or-less complete picture of the disparities 
between countries, an important tool for analyzing the expected success of integration. Key 
statistical information comes from the databases of the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund, among other sources. 
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European Trade and Political Integration 
 
Integration in the European Union has been an ongoing process, rooted in the formation 
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. A coalition of six countries 
(France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium) came together, forming a 
supranational organization that regulated the coal and steel industries among these countries. Its 
key initiative was to coordinate economic policy and create a more efficient market through tariff 
reduction (Groenendijk). This was principally done in an effort to aid World War II 
reconstruction across the region. 
 European reconstruction served as a primary driver for large-scale trade integration. The 
United States’ Marshall Plan called for a free trade area, a customs union, and a reduction in 
social welfare spending (Carolan). The end-goal of the plan was to create an intra-governmental 
body that would eventually evolve into a common market in Europe (Carolan). In response to 
these demands, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was created on 
April 16, 1948. The organization initially had 16 members from across Europe, and required 
unanimity among representatives for most decisions. As a result of the OEEC’s efforts to 
encourage free trade, 89% of private intra-European trade in 1959 was subject to free trade 
regulation (OECD). 
 In September of 1950, the European Payments Union (EPU) was created within the 
OEEC to allow for easier currency exchange between European countries. Currency reserves 
were placed under the EPU to facilitate exchange until the currencies were established as 
tradable with the US Dollar in 1958 (Baldwin).  In 1961, the OEEC was replaced by the newly 
created OECD, which has become a global cooperative with goals similar to that of its 
predecessor, the OEEC (OECD). 
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 The European Union of today primarily regulates economic issues, although its powers 
have been extended to cover social and political concerns as well. The Union follows a common 
market policy, which provides for the free movement of goods between member nations. This 
policy has been expanded to cover intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment. 
External trade policy is dictated by the European Commission and the European Council, both of 
which are Union-level governmental institutions (Bakker). The two bodies work alongside each 
other to set the common customs tariff for goods imported from outside the EU, while also 
negotiating trade agreements with other countries. 
 Additional institutions are in place to facilitate cooperation between members in other 
governmental areas. The Department for Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) focuses on internal 
Union issues, working to enforce EU law throughout the region (Bakker). For example, the 
cooperation of police, border control administration, and cross-border crimes all fall under the 
jurisdiction of the JHA. 
 The Lisbon Treaty of 2013 served to simplify and accelerate governing procedures and 
increase the Union’s transparency on a global stage. Legislation on several issues that previously 
required a unanimous vote now only requires a majority vote, in an effort to facilitate greater 
responsiveness to key initiatives and to incentivize cooperation among member states (Archick). 
Ideally, if only a majority vote is required, countries will be more willing to compromise on 
legislation to reach a suitable agreement, instead of merely stalling the legislation indefinitely (a 
real possibility given a required unanimous vote). This policy change is partly in response to the 
planned expansion of the Union, since unanimity will become increasingly more difficult to 
achieve as more countries enter the Union. In order to increase the transparency and bargaining 
power of the EU on the global political stage, a new governmental title was created. The office 
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of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy serves as the 
Union’s head diplomat, providing a single, unified voice for the EU on foreign policy issues 
(Archick). Overall, the Lisbon Treaty seeks to elevate the political power of the Union as a 
whole and to streamline legislative procedures. 
 As the European Union continues to grow and mature as an economic and governmental 
institution, it has strived to present a unified image in regards to foreign affairs, while working to 
expand its regulatory power to cover a broad range of internal policy issues. 
Monetary Implementation 
 
 The foundation of the European Monetary Union is the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, in 
which the 15 member nations agreed to conform to a single currency, managed by a European 
central bank. According to Arestis, two prerequisites have historically been required for the 
sustainable success of a monetary union.  The first, a preexisting political union, did not exist in 
its entirety before and during the implementation of the European Monetary Union, and indeed is 
still not a fully formed and functioning body today.  Large strides have been made in the attempt 
to resolve this issue, mostly in the area of economic policy.  The second historical condition for 
the success of a monetary union is convergence among members, measured most commonly by 
income per capita (Arestis). Years after the conversion to the Euro was complete, there were still 
large discrepancies among member states in income per capita. In fact, the largest country’s 
income per capita was more than four times that of the smallest in 2004, and the Eurozone had 
yet to commence statistically-significant convergence by this date (Arestis). 
 The structure of the European Central Bank (ECB) outlines overarching goals for the 
region and also delineates certain powers to national governments.  The primary goal of the ECB 
is to maintain price stability through interest-rate manipulation.  The ECB targets price stability 
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by working to keep the inflation rate at or below 2%.  In terms of fiscal policy, the ECB is left 
with few tools at its disposal to use the concept effectively. The ECB’s budget is a mere 1% of 
the GDP of the Union as a whole (Arestis), preventing the possibility of meaningful fiscal 
intervention into the economy. Instead, fiscal policy is left entirely to member nations, with few 
guidelines as to the overall goals of fiscal policy.  Along the same lines, there is no policy in 
place for income transfers or exchange rate devaluation in the case of external imbalances 
(Arestis).  This makes persistent trade imbalances difficult to reverse, and is likely part of the 
issue with several countries that struggled in the recent economic crisis. Given the EMU’s heavy 
focus on price stability and its limited budget, there are no overarching, supranational policies to 
pursue traditional economic goals of low unemployment and sustained economic growth.  These 
goals are seemingly passed to member states to achieve. 
 The goal of convergence is addressed in the European Union through the Stability and 
Growth Pact, signed by every Eurozone member, which outlines policies to be undertaken by 
each individual country to limit budget deficits and overall debt.  In order for a country to 
convert its currency to the Euro, national budget deficits were required to be less than 3% of 
annual GDP, with an overall debt less than 60% of GDP.  Other requirements were set in place, 
limiting inflation to 3.2% per annum, and requiring government bond yields to be at least 7.7%.  
These very conservative guidelines have proved rather difficult for countries to meet 
consistently. Indeed, the EU’s average debt to GDP ratio in the first quarter of 2013 was 92.8%, 
far exceeding the organization’s original ceiling of 60% (Eurostat 2013). Although the events of 
2008 called for drastic, corrective economic measures, the disparity between these two ratios is 
too high to accept as normal. It seems that the debt-to-GDP requirement has largely fallen by the 
wayside in recent years. Similarly, the requirement that budget deficits be no greater than 3% of 
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annual GDP makes national fiscal policy difficult to enact effectively, as funding for fiscal 
policy would therefore need to be taken from other departments. Economic policies are largely 
unattainable, given this restriction (Machinea). 
 In response to the economic crisis of 2008, the European Union has responded to the lack 
of an institution to aide in the event of balance of payments crises and other flawed economic 
structures with the creation of the European Stability Mechanism. This fund, with a budget of 
500 billion euros, is an attempt to account for the differences between member nations and assist 
in the event of a crisis (Andor). Theoretically, this fund could have lessened the recent crisis by 
mitigating the effects of debt crises in Greece, Spain, and Ireland, among others.  
Financial Effects of Euro Implementation 
Large costs were obviously associated with the transition to a uniform Eurozone 
currency, hopefully outweighed by the benefits that such uniformity would give to the European 
community at large. Switching costs were incurred globally, as financial institutions worked to 
update and create new software capable of calculating accurate exchange rates between the Euro 
and the US dollar (then frequently used as a vehicle currency between European countries) and 
between the Euro and its pre-Euro counterparts (Claes). An estimated 100 billion US$ were 
spent to prepare for the Euro switch (Wheelen). The required reduction of national spending on 
social welfare also has an indirect cost in the form of magnified effects of unemployment. 
Budget limitations restrict the level of spending on social welfare programs (Wheelen), which 
greatly diminishes the potential impact of government intervention to counteract the effects of 
unemployment and other socioeconomic problems.  
The benefits of a single European currency are compelling, even in the face of such costs.  
In a 2000 report, Rose states that the “adoption of a common currency has a positive impact on 
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trade,” which occurs for several reasons. The ability to conduct business between member 
countries in a single currency significantly reduces transaction costs, given the fact that currency 
exchange never enters the situation. According to Claes, “two-thirds of the commercial relations 
of EU member states take place between members,” representing a large majority of member 
transactions and as such a large reduction in incurred transaction costs.  Cross-country 
transactions between member states have become much simpler as a result, eliminating the need 
for currency exchanges.  Additionally, a reduction in transaction costs would be realized in 
international trade—that is, trade between a Eurozone member and a non-member (Claes).  The 
rise of the Euro as a key financial currency, similar in importance to the US dollar, allows for 
easy currency exchange, without the need for a vehicle currency to fairly convert prices from one 
currency to another.  
An added benefit to the implementation of a common currency is the effect on trade 
barriers. Indeed, it has been shown that the likelihood of non-tariff trade barriers is much lower 
in a region with a common currency (Machinea). A reduction in trade barriers generally leads to 
higher levels of trade, and subsequently higher GDP. 
Labor Mobility 
 
In the absence of the possibility of exchange rate manipulation and regulated income 
transfers, convergence between countries within a monetary union depends largely on labor 
mobility as an equalizing factor to maintain stability within the union. The Eurozone finds itself 
in exactly this position, as no supranational guidelines are in place to correct income disparities 
and persistent trade imbalances among countries.  
 Before delving into the statistics of Eurozone labor mobility, it is important to note that 
several countries have in the past imposed restrictions on labor mobility as the Eurozone 
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expanded (Dijkstra). Many countries (e.g., Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal) have lessened these 
restrictions over time; however, this does skew comparisons with large countries such as the 
United States. 
 Statistically, cross-border labor mobility between Eurozone member states has remained 
low, as seen in Table 1. This figure is less than half of the comparison statistic (1.98%) for the 
USA, a large country with low inter-state migration barriers. As of 2013, cross-border migration 
within the EU has improved drastically, with 3% of EU citizens living and working in a country 
other than their home country.  
Table 1: Labor Mobility of USA vs EU-27, 2006 
 US EU-27 
Share of working age residents who moved  
from a different region/state 
1.98% 0.96% 
Net migration 0.40% 0.32% 
Source: Dijkstra 
 
Demonstrated need for migration and mobility 
 The overarching structure of the EU creates a dependency on labor mobility as an 
adjustment mechanism to correct economic divergence between Member States. The absence of 
the possibility of exchange rate manipulation and the lack of supranational or national fiscal 
policy (due to budget deficit restrictions) prevent the use of other commonplace adjustment 
mechanisms. However, it is unclear if mobility rates are high enough to truly serve as a 
correction mechanism. In 2013, just 3% of EU citizens lived and worked in a member nation 
other than their home country (Hayden). Low levels of mobility prompted the EU Employment 
Commission, Lazlo Andor, to remark, “With much higher levels of unemployment in some 
member states than others at the moment, it is all the more important to make it easier for those 
that want to work in another EU country to be able to do so” (Andor, qtd in Hayden). Thus, labor 
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mobility is seen as a tool to lessen the disparities between member countries, especially under the 
modern circumstances of high unemployment across the region. Greater labor mobility must be 
encouraged to accelerate convergence between EU Member States for the long-run success of 
the Union. 
 Additionally, there are significant benefits to the encouragement of labor mobility within 
the region. With an unemployment rate of 10.9% across the EU in 2013 (Andor), it is 
increasingly more important that job seekers have the ability to take advantage of the 
opportunities provided to them through the sophisticated integration of EU member states. Labor 
mobility creates a natural mechanism for the removal of unnecessary labor from a country, while 
also freeing that government from the high cost of supporting that unemployed labor force 
(Kahanec). Receiving countries benefit from the added human capital, and migrant workers 
benefit financially from gained employment. These represent significant structural and financial 
benefits to the region as a whole. As an additional incentive, labor mobility tends to cause more 
freely moving wage rates. As the supply and demand of labor vary, wage rates should begin to 
normalize across the region. Although wage rates typically do not fall, it is likely that some 
wages will rise in an effort to attract more labor, thus minimizing the difference between wages 
on a country-by-country basis. 
An Overview of MercoSur’s Member Countries 
 The Common Market of the South, or MercoSur, is currently comprised of five member 
nations: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, with several other South 
American countries that have achieved associate membership.  The five full members of 
MercoSur have functioning democracies. 
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 Economically speaking, the countries that comprise MercoSur are very diverse, with 
different levels of development and global influence.  Brazil’s economy, the largest in South 
America, is diversified into several different sectors, rather than depending heavily on one key 
industry (CIA).  A strong recovery after the devaluation of its currency in 1999 has made Brazil 
the largest South American economy (Rios). Due to its large population, Brazil’s domestic 
market serves as an insulator against shocks in the external market (World Bank). Significant 
efforts have been made to reduce the income inequality that has plagued Brazil for many years; 
income inequality has been falling steadily for the past decade (IMF).  These positive measures 
have led to the appreciation of the Brazilian real (“Brazil…”), representing a major concern for 
the competitiveness of Brazil’s large export sector. 
 The second-largest player in MercoSur has greater problems to face. Argentina in recent 
years has faced double-digit inflation, due to a dependence on expansionary governmental policy 
to sustain growth (CIA). In response to such high inflation, the Argentinian government has 
stepped in to try to counteract the problem. Import restrictions have been levied, and currency 
controls have been expanded in an effort to stabilize the economy (IMF). On a more positive 
note, sustained economic growth has led to a reduction in unemployment to levels not seen since 
before the country’s economic crisis in 2002 (World Bank).  
 Similarly, Paraguay is facing large economic issues of its own. With no large industries 
to build the economy, Paraguay relies on agriculture as a key factor in its economy (BBC). The 
government has depended upon stimulus spending to encourage and maintain growth in the face 
of several agricultural shocks to the economy (IMF, 2013). Additionally, high levels of 
corruption and smuggling across Paraguayan borders have proved difficult to curtail (BBC). 
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Recent political uncertainty and a lack of infrastructure compared to its MercoSur counterparts 
(CIA) pose challenges to the long-term sustained growth of Paraguay. 
 Uruguay seems to have benefitted the most from its membership to MercoSur. Its 
economy is largely dependent upon agricultural exports (BBC), which have been leveraged to 
expand trade globally. Despite large government expenditure following the 2002 crisis, Uruguay 
has managed to expand total trade within MercoSur by 70% and nearly double its total trade with 
the rest of the world (IMF). It has seen positive economic progress in recent years, as the country 
has continued to decrease its public debt to GDP ratio year over year (World Bank). 
 Venezuela, the newest full member of MercoSur, has many serious economic problems 
that pose a threat to the long-term growth of the nation. The country’s dependence on oil as its 
key industry allows for large swings in overall economic performance. Accounting for 95% of 
the country’s exports (CIA), a sharp drop in oil prices in 2011 sent the country into a recession. 
A fixed exchange rate with the US dollar has led to record inflation levels, reaching near 50% in 
2014 (BBC). Public debt as a percentage of GDP has risen to 49% (IMF), raising concerns about 
the overall health of the country. 
 Overall, the economies of MercoSur fall into two distinct groups: those that continue to 
realize growth, and those that are struggling to maintain current economic levels.  The majority 
of member nations have seen large increases in public expenditure and public debt in an effort to 
combat the effects of the economic crisis of 2010.  Additionally, high inflation is a major 
concern for several countries and has not yet begun to subside.  These factors have a large impact 
on the overall health and sustainability of MercoSur as an institution. 
 The relative size of each country’s economy represents an obstacle to higher-order 
integration. The trade bloc is dominated by two members, Brazil and Argentina, who comprise 
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85% of the overall GDP of MercoSur. While this is positive in that the two countries can provide 
clear leadership, their dominance also reinforces the structural differences between countries, a 
potential problem for the continued integration of the region. 
Figure 1: GDP Levels as a Percent of MercoSur, 2012 
 
Source: IMF 
 
 Disparities between the member nations of MercoSur also pose a threat to the longevity 
of the organization. Varying levels of dependency on the organization can be seen through the 
trade intensity levels presented in Table 2. Exports to other Mercosur countries range from 13% 
to 85%. While import levels are more or less consistent, this data demonstrates the impact that 
trade within MercoSur has for each country. Such a wide range brings to mind questions of the 
possibility for unified goals for the future of MercoSur. It stands to reason that there could be a 
conflict of interest for overall goals among members: more dependent members focusing more 
on regional trade, while other members concentrate on the expansion of external trade 
agreements.  
Argentina 
$472,392.81  
14.9% 
Brazil 
$2,249,799.31  
70.8% 
Paraguay 
$24,615.02  
0.8% 
Uruguay 
$49,929.14  
1.6% 
Venezuela 
$381,472.84  
12.0% 
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Table 2: Trade Intensity, 1999-2001 
 % Exports to Mercosur % Imports from Mercosur 
Argentina  30.0 0.9 
Brazil 13.3 0.5 
Paraguay 85.6 1.3 
Uruguay 43.5 1.0 
Source: Rios 
If countries cannot thrive on their own, is it possible for them to meaningful growth 
within the confines of a larger customs union?  Furthermore, does it become the responsibility of 
more economically stable members to support those countries that falter? 
Structure of MercoSur 
 While MercoSur’s governing institutions are not as complete as their European 
counterpart, the trade bloc has established several bodies to regulate policies and further 
encourage integration. The Treaty of Asunción in 1991 formed the basis of modern-day 
MercoSur, extending a previous agreement between Brazil and Argentina to also include 
Paraguay and Uruguay (Bakker). These four countries comprised the main member states of 
MercoSur until the admission of Venezuela as a full member in July 2012. Three primary 
institutions serve as the primary foundation of the intergovernmental organization: the Common 
Market Council (CMC), the Common Market Group (GMC), and the MercoSur Trade 
Commission (CCM). 
 Firstly, the Common Market Council serves as the primary political body for MercoSur. 
Comprised of Ministers of Foreign Relations and Economy from each member country, the 
CMC is considered the most powerful governmental body within MercoSur (Bakker). Its 
primary focus is to establish the political direction of the bloc and to serve as the primary 
decision-making body on general policy issues. In contrast, the Common Market Group serves as 
the executive branch of MercoSur, charged with implementing the policies set forth by the CMC. 
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The GMC is made up in large part by representatives from each member country’s central bank 
(Doctor). Finally, the MercoSur Trade Commission establishes trade policy for the union, both 
internally and externally. It manages trade relationships internally between member states and 
also oversees external agreements between MercoSur and other countries. 
 In recent years, MercoSur has expanded the breadth of its governmental institutions to 
cover a wider range of issues. The early 2000s were marked by a period of restructuring, in 
which MercoSur shifted beyond trade and economy into more sociopolitical issues (Santos). In 
2006, ParlaSur was created from the former Joint Parliamentary Commission, in order to address 
problems outside of trade, business, and the economy. More specifically, ParlaSur focuses on 
social issues such as education and environmental issues (Bakker). However, it has struggled to 
make an impactful difference, as its resolutions are nonbinding and funding for such endeavors is 
limited (Botto). Additionally, the parliamentary body has struggled to come to a conclusion 
regarding fair representation among members. The debate centers around equal representation by 
country, or representation based on population. The likely conclusion of this issue is that Brazil 
and Argentina will comprise 48% and 27%, respectively, of ParlaSur by 2015 (Bakker). 
Similarly, the judicial system within MercoSur has struggled to find a way to enforce its laws. 
Because each member state retains a high degree of autonomy, MercoSur legislation does not 
supersede that of an individual country, so binding resolutions must be incorporated into each 
country’s body of laws (Doctor). As of 2004, only 48% of MercoSur legislation had actually 
been enforced (Bakker), calling into question the efficacy of the organization as a long-term 
driver for integration. 
 A marked difference between the institutions of MercoSur and the EU is their respective 
treatment of the necessity for structural adjustment. While the EU recognizes this issue, its 
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monetary fund for structural adjustment is largely unfunded, comprising just 1% of the European 
Monetary Union’s overall budget (Wheelen). In contrast, its Latin American counterpart, 
MercoSur’s Fund for Structural Convergence (FOCEM) has received significant contributions 
from MercoSur’s member nations in an attempt to lessen the disparities between countries on 
several fronts, including education, healthcare, and infrastructure. Over the next ten years, 
MercoSur’s member nations will annually contribute 100 million US dollars to the fund, with the 
majority of financing being provided by Argentina and Brazil (Ramon-Berjano). Disbursements 
will be received primarily by the remaining members for improvements to infrastructure, 
although the potential impact of such projects is debatable (Ramon-Berjano).  
Challenges to MercoSur’s Success 
While MercoSur has certainly come a long way since its inception in 1991, the trade 
organization still has challenges that it must face head-on. There are lessons to be learned by 
looking at the highly integrated European Monetary Union, which in recent years has struggled 
to deal with a deep-rooted financial crisis, stemming from structural imbalances between its 
member nations. MercoSur must therefore chart its own path for continued integration and 
hopefully avoid the problems faced by its predecessors. 
 The first major issue that the member countries of MercoSur must address is their 
continued insistence on preserved autonomy, instead refocusing their efforts on a small amount 
of reduced autonomy with the ultimate goal of further regional integration. Currently, MercoSur 
has no supranational institutions to collectively govern the member nations. In some respects, 
this is advantageous, as it allows a wider range of responses to economic issues. For example, a 
member of MercoSur that finds itself in economic distress can use both monetary and fiscal 
policy in an attempt to recover from the troubles at hand. This is not the case for countries within 
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the EMU, as monetary policy is controlled and allocated by the Stability and Growth Pact 
(Wheelen). However, fiscal and monetary policies are not the historical course of action for 
MercoSur.  The economic crises of 1999 and 2002 in Brazil and Argentina, respectively, were 
not seen as opportunities to lean on the other members of MercoSur for support. Instead, both 
countries chose to return to more protectionist policies, due in large part to the extreme pressures 
applied by each country’s population (Doctor). The devaluation of the Brazilian real saw in 
response greater protectionist measures by the rest of the region, as the area’s most dominant 
player suddenly became much more competitive, due to exchange rate manipulation (Machinea). 
As the economies of MercoSur become increasingly more integrated, protectionism will become 
more and more difficult to implement effectively, instead forcing countries to rely more heavily 
on open trade. 
 Another obstacle facing MercoSur is the varying degree of dependency that each member 
country has on the trade bloc as a whole. As stated by Botto, “irregularities between national 
markets hamper growth” in the long run. This is certainly the case for MercoSur, especially 
when one considers the prevalence (or lack thereof) of inter-regional trade. As can be seen in 
Table 2, Paraguay and Uruguay are exceptionally dependent upon trade with other MercoSur 
members, as more than 40% of each country’s exports are with other members. Argentina is 
similarly dependent upon the organization, with approximately 30% of trade occurring with 
other members. Brazil, however, is in a much different situation. Largely seen as the primary 
leader of MercoSur, trade with member countries represents just 10% of its total GDP (Ramon-
Berjano). I would argue that this disparity is not, in reality, a purely negative characteristic of the 
organization. According to Grigoli, GDP growth rates between the members of MercoSur have 
converged over time, as the level of economic integration has increased. The author also 
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concludes that regional trade decreases as openness to trade increases, due to each country’s 
increased focus on exports outside the trade union (Grigoli). These findings seem to support 
MercoSur’s current trajectory. As can be seen in Table 2, the more globalized economies of 
Argentina and Brazil do indeed have a much less regional focus than their counterparts. 
Although there are disparities between nations, growth rates and regional dependencies should 
continue to converge while member nations shift their focus to newer trade partners.  
A major advantage of the structure of MercoSur is its adherence to the Most-Favored 
Nation concept. In theory, each country’s competitive advantages in trade are shared with the 
organization as a whole, in order to make the entire organization more competitive. Under this 
theory, each country follows a similar structure for tariffs and customs fees. This concept was 
initially enforced by the Common External Tariff of 2001 (CET), which by 2006 covered 85% of 
the region’s traded goods, while 95% of trade between member nations fell under a free trade 
area (Doctor). Despite the success of the CET, it was replaced with a more complete customs 
code that was signed in 2010. The new customs code ensures a 1-time-only customs duty within 
MercoSur, eliminating dual customs charges for transporting between member nations (Ramon-
Berjano). This simple alteration to MercoSur’s import policy makes the region much more 
attractive to external trade partners because of an immediately lower cost of importation. The 
European Union, previously reluctant to sign a bilateral trade agreement with MercoSur, has 
showed renewed interest in the trade bloc as the area becomes a more attractive trade partner 
(Ramon-Berjano). The continued institutional development of MercoSur makes it more 
competitive on a global scale, deepening the prospects for further external trade. 
 With that said, it is important to note the difficulties of actualizing bilateral trade 
agreements. The current structure of MercoSur requires a unanimous vote on new trade 
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agreements (“Brazil Seeks...”). Indeed, this requirement extends to several areas of the 
organization, raising questions of MercoSur’s ability to reach meaningful decisions in the future. 
As MercoSur continues to expand (with Venezuela becoming a full member as of July 2013), a 
unanimous vote becomes increasingly more difficult, especially given the high degree of 
autonomy retained by each member country. If any current member felt that a trade deal would 
violate its own interests for the betterment of the organization as a whole, it is entirely plausible 
that the measure would be vetoed. The unanimous vote also stands in the way of continued 
integration. Moving forward, it stands to reason that at least some degree of independence should 
be relinquished in order to reduce barriers to trade and simultaneously make the region a more 
attractive trading partner.  
Recommendations and Conclusion 
 As MercoSur looks to the future, there are several key takeaways from the information 
presented in this paper. First, the organization must look to strengthen its weakest structure: 
ParlaSur. In order to move toward a more integrated future, it is necessary that the citizens of 
MercoSur be placed on equal footing. Educational standards are already in place to reduce the 
disparity between nations, but more social policies must be enacted to further lessen social 
differences. The introduction of unified policies that deal with labor relations, wage rates, and 
other issues would do much to create a more standardized base for human capital across the 
region. 
 In addition, MercoSur should look to continue expanding its external trade agreements 
over time. As discussed by Grigoli, business cycle integration improves with the expansion of 
external trade. This in turn reduces the trade differences between member nations, allowing for 
smoother and more effective integration. Given MercoSur’s history of increased protectionism in 
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times of economic hardship (see Argentina in 1999 and Brazil in 2001), this issue should also be 
addressed. Rather than relying on individual protectionist policies, inter-regional barriers to trade 
should be virtually eliminated, instead focusing on the use of the Customs Code of 2010 to 
protect industry across the region when necessary. To aide in the transition to greater utilization 
of Customs Code, the FOCEM can be utilized to make structural adjustments between countries. 
Its large budget makes the FOCEM a great tool to continue the convergence of economies 
throughout MercoSur. 
 Finally, monetary integration in MercoSur is a distant possibility, contingent upon several 
conditions that serve to lessen the structural differences between member countries. Exchange 
rates should begin to converge within the region, and should ideally follow the same trends over 
time. This can be achieved with greater external trade integration as the region becomes more 
dependent on external trading partners. Greater dependency on foreign trade partners creates 
greater dependency on global economic outlook. This dependency is translated into the 
expectations and valuations of each country’s exchange rate, which should create greater 
alignment for exchange rate fluctuations within MercoSur. Indeed, this seems to be the case for 
several of the currencies within Mercosur, as can be seen in Figure 2. It seems that the currencies 
of Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay have roughly followed similar trends over the past five years. 
In spite of following similar trends with the rest of the region, Brazil has encountered inflation 
beyond that of Paraguay and Uruguay. Argentina has seen consistent inflation that has 
outstripped all of the other freely-floating exchange rates within the organization, ending 113% 
above its value in March of 2009. For this reason it has been omitted from the table, in order to 
better show the similar trends within the region. 
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Figure 2: Percentage change in exchange rates, March 2009 - March 2014. 
 
Source: www.oanda.com 
 
 If large fluctuations in exchange rate valuations cannot be mitigated by increasing 
external trade, there is the possibility of a banded exchange rate regime. Machinea asserts that 
this policy is the most suitable alternative if currency integration is not possible. However this 
approach should be considered with caution, as Venezuela has adopted a fixed exchange rate 
with the US dollar and has since seen high levels of inflation, in spite of multiple currency 
devaluations over the past several years. In theory, adopting similar exchange rate regimes across 
the organization controls for large exchange rate fluctuations, leading to greater stability in 
relative prices across the region. 
Monetary integration is also dependent upon the consistency of interest rates and inflation 
rates across the organization. These measures are extremely important if MercoSur is ever to 
transition to a supranational central bank, so that financial disparities between countries are 
minimized. MercoSur set an inflation ceiling of 4% for the region (Machinea), which seems 
plausible for an organization comprised of developing countries. Although it is above that of the 
European Union, one must consider that developing countries would normally experience greater 
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inflation as GDP increases. Most importantly, a cap should be placed on the debt to GDP ratio 
for each country. The wide range of debt to GDP percentages can be seen in Table 3, yet another 
structural difference between member countries. The European Union placed a cap at 60% of 
GDP, however this was not strictly enforced. It is imperative that debt ratios be managed in order 
to minimize the likelihood of default and the ensuing reliance on other countries for financial 
support. The disregard of this condition within the European Union was a large contributing 
factor in the extensive debt crisis of the late 2000s. 
Table 3: Public Debt to GDP ratio 
Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay Venezuela 
44.2% 66.2% 13.5% 54.1% 45.5% 
Source: IMF 
 
 
 Admittedly, integration is a slow process that requires compromise from all sides in order 
to progress effectively. However, integration can be achieved if the best interests of the whole 
are kept at the center of debate. The European Union is an effective model to use when looking 
to structure a highly integrated region, but its power comes not only in the example it has set, but 
also in the pitfalls it has encountered along the way. The continued integration of MercoSur is 
challenging, but incredibly possible thanks to the lessons learned by the European Union. 
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